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My role in this symposium is a modest one: it is to clear the
ring for the feature fight of the program between Dean Brown
and Professor Hartman. I am to sweep away some of the rubbish
in the ring that often gets in the way of a clean battle on issues of
ethics. I think the most serious rubbish that needs to be swept
away is the widely prevailing notion that ethics is something off
in the clouds, or off in some never-never land of Utopia, something
uncertain and subjective, whereas the law is something that is
very definite, clear, hard, here and now. Of course, if that were
true, there would be no point in trying to apply ethical doctrines
to actual cases.
That the teachings of ethics can and should be applied to
actual cases is not a novel idea. It was urged years ago by an il-
lustrious law teacher and judge. Speaking of ethical doctrine, he
commented:
It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go
up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, and make us to
hear it, that we may do it? Neither is it beyond the sea,
that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us,
and bring it unto us, and make us to hear it, that we may
do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth,
and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.
In line with this admonition of the illustrious teacher whose
words I quote, the participants in this symposium have agreed to
talk about things that are here, in our hearts, before us, and close
at hand, and not entirely in some Utopia or heaven of abstractions.
We all agree on one basic point: that whatever else the theory
of value or ethics may be, it should at least be a criticism of things
that happen day after day in our courts and in our legislatures,
as well as in the privacy of our own thoughts.
The case of Ole f v. Hodapp, provides us with a fair test of
this hypothesis of the universal applicability of ethical judgments
or ethical values. In that case a man named Tego Miovanis had
a joint bank account with his uncle, Apostol Miovanis. Each de-
positor had unlimited authority to withdraw funds. Apparently
Tego was afraid that this unlimited authority might be abused
by his uncle, and so he removed the uncle from this mortal scene.
The Ohio Court had to decide whether as a result of the murder,
the joint deposit now belonged exclusively to the murderer, or
whether the heirs or representatives of the murderee continued to
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have an interest in the joint deposit. The court decided, by a
majority vote, that after the murder the bank account belonged
completely and exclusively to the murderer. Passing over for the
moment the question of the correctness or incorrectness of that
decision, let us try to understand what it was that the court thought
it was doing when it reached that decision. I quote from what the
Court said it was doing:
We are not subscribing to the righteousness of Tego's legal
status; but this is a court of law and not a theological in-
stitution.... Property cannot be taken from an individual
who is legally entitled to it because he violates a public
policy.2 Property rights are too sacred to be subjected to
a danger of that character. We experience no satisfaction
in holding that Tego is entitled to this account; but that is
the law, and we must so find.3
There are two things about this opinion that are particularly
interesting. One is the Court's statement that "this is a court of
law and not a theological institution." The second is the court's
statement that "property rights are too sacred" to be subjected
to certain dangers that would follow if the courts allowed considera-
tions of "righteousness" or "public policy" to influence decisions
on property rights. Property rights, we are told are too sacred.
Apparently, if property rights were less sacred, or if the right to
life were more sacred, the court might have decided the case
against the murderer Tego and in favor of the representatives of
the murdered uncle.
This question of the comparative sacredness or holiness of
different rights is, I think, one of the most important questions
that theological institutions have been considering for a good many
years. It seems to me that this question of whether one property
right, or civil right, or human right is more or less sacred than
another is a very important part of theology. Why, then, should
the Ohio Supreme Court insist that it is not a theological institu-
tion when it passes upon the relative sacredness of different rights?
Before we consider that question further, a few words are
in order about a case very similar to the Oieff case, disposed of
about two hundred years ago, the so-called Highwaymen's Case.
Modern research has shown that this case was not invented by a
law professor who wanted to keep his students on the straight and
narrow path, but apparently was a real case.4 In this case, one
highwayman brought suit against his associate for a fair division
of the booty. The case was very skillfully pleaded; the bill of
complaint does not recite that the plaintiff was a highwayman, but
2 Note the delicacy of the court's reference to murder.
3 129 Ohio St. at 438, 195 N. at 841.
4 See Everet v. Williams (1725), 9 L. Q. Rev. 197 (1893).
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merely alleges that there was a mutual partnership, that "the
plaintiff was skilled in dealing in several sorts of commodities,"
that the parties had, "proceeded jointly in the said dealings with
good success on Hounslow Heath, where they dealt with a gentle-
man for a gold watch," and then further recounts how they dealt
with several other gentlemen for divers watches, rings, swords,
canes, hats, cloaks, horses, bridles, saddles and other things of the
value of about 2,000 pounds. Finally the complaint recites that
the defendant refused to abide by the partnership agreement to
divide the swag evenly.
The plaintiff was not successful in the case. Apparently the
property rights and contract rights of the plaintiff enjoyed a lesser
degree of sacredness in the Court of Exchequer in 1725 than they
would enjoy before the courts of Ohio today. At any rate, the
Court of Exchequer ordered the tipstaff to attach the bodies of
the plaintiff's solicitors. They were fined 50 pounds each and com-
mitted to the custody of the Warden of the Fleet pending payment
of the fines. One of the solicitors was thereafter transported, and
apparently founded one of the First Families of Virginia. At that,
he did rather better than did the defendant and the plaintiff, who
were both hanged. I suppose that the Ohio Supreme Court would
consider that this was a rather theological disposition of the case.
These two decisions are both significant because they indicate
two different approaches to the question of how far a court of law
may properly look into questions of ethics, or public policy, or
theology.
The approaches that are reflected in these two cases are
further illuminated in the third case on our agenda, the case of
the Northwest Shoshone5 It seems that before the talented but
unfortunate solicitor in the Highwayman's Case was transported
to North America, this country was claimed by Indians who thought
they owned it. Ever since the arrival of the first white immigrants,
they have been devoting some of their finest legal talents to dis-
covering defects in these Indian titles and, in that way, devising
justifications for the removal of land, minerals, and timber from
Indian ownership to white ownership, in the interest of progress.
One of the most brilliant and ingenious justifications of this process
is that which is given by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion
in this Northwest Shoshone case. He advances the theory that
Indians were really communists, who did not understand or ap-
preciate property rights. Ownership of land, he says, "meant no
more to them than . . .sunlight and the west wind, and the feel
of spring in the air. Acquisitiveness, which develops a law of real
SNorthwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335
(1945).
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property, is an accomplishment only of the civilized." It follows,
then, that the United States being civilized, is under no legal
obligation to pay Indians when it takes away their homes, their
timber, their fisheries, their water power, or anything else that
might be needed for railroads, canneries, pulp companies or other
progressive organizations that appreciate property rights. In ad-
vancing this theory that civilized people have the right to relieve
less civilized people of their possessions, Justice Jackson insists
that the moral and the legal have nothing to do with each other.
He says specifically, referring to moral deserts and legal rights,
"... we do not mean to leave the impression the two have any
relation to each other."' 6 Justice Jackson might very well have
said what the Ohio Supreme Court said in the Oleff case: "This
is a court of law and not a theological institution."
In fact, however, the same question that Justice Jackson was
considering had been referred by government officials some years
earlier to a theological institution. The question whether Indian
titles were good against the government was referred to a professor
of moral theology at the University of Salamanca in 1532 by the
Spanish Crown, which was naturally concerned about the relative
rights of the Crown and the Indians with respect to lands of the
New World.
Professor Vitoria considered the sociological facts of the situa-
tion. He considered the sinfulness of the life of the Indians prior
to the coming of the Spaniards. He considered the fact that Spain
had discovered and explored the New World under a special grant
of the Pope. He considered all the general facts that Justice Jackson
considered, and came to the conclusion that the relative ignorance
and sinfulness of the Indians could not impair their title to their
property. He concluded that the Spaniards' discovery of the In-
dians did not give the Spaniards any right to Indian property any
more than the Indians' discovery of the Spaniards gave the Indians
a right to Spanish property. And finally he reached the conclu-
sion, a rather courageous conclusion for a professor of moral the-
ology in the University of Salamanca to reach, that since the Pope's
authority was purely spiritual, and limited to those that acknowl-
edged his spiritual jurisdiction, the Pope could not, even if he
wanted to, bestow any title to land upon the Spanish Crown or
any other crown, and the only title to land that could be acquired
by the Crown would have to be by way of agreement or treaty
with the Indians concerned. 7
If this question of the right of the powerful to take from the
6 Id at 358
7 Cf. F. S. Cohen, Thet Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the
United States, 31 Geo. L. J. 1 (1942).
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weak was properly a theological question (as I think it was), was
it not just as theological when Justice Jackson answered it in his
way as it was when Professor Francisco Vitoria answered it 400
years earlier, in his way?
All through the cases that have been mentioned so far runs
the basic question whether the acquisition of wealth by superior
force establishes a right to legal protection of such acquisitions.
Whichever way you answer this question, whether you answer
that might makes right, or answer it the other way, you are
answering a basic question of ethics, or theology, or whatever
else you want to call the study of values, of good and bad.
Let us pursue this analysis a bit further with the cases of
the minimum wage and the flag salute.8
We all recall the Adkins case, involving the constitutionality
of the minimum wage statute in the District of Columbia, as the
case in which Justice Sutherland said that changes in the status
of women culminating in the 19th amendment had brought the
difference between the sexes, "almost, if not quite, to the vanish-
ing point," and Justice Holmes replied: "It will need more than
the 19th amendment to convince me that there are no differences
between men and women."
In the Adkins case, Justice Sutherland could not see any moral
issue, because, he said, the morals of rich women were no better
than the morals of poor women. From this he concluded that
questions of morality had nothing to do with the case. Indeed he
went further and commented on the brief that had been submitted
by Professor (not yet Justice) Frankfurter, showing what actually
happens when women have to work long hours for inadequate
wages. Speaking for a majority of the Court, Justice Sutherland
said of these facts:
These are all proper enough for the consideration of the
law-making bodies, since their tendency is to establish
the desirability or undesirability of the legislation; but
they reflect no legitimate light upon the question of its
validity, and that is what we are called upon to decide.
The decision that Justice Sutherland announced in the Adkins
case is dead and decently buried by the Supreme Court's de-
cision 14 years later in the West Coast Hotel Company case. 9 But
we still have with us the approach and spirit of Justice Sutherland's
majority opinion in that case, the insistence that considerations
which establish the desirability or undesirability of legislation
throw "no legitimate light" on its constitutionality. And very
curiously, one finds Justice Frankfurter, in the Barnette case,10
S Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
" West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
10 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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using the same club that Justic Sutherland used against him, but
this time using it against his brethren, the majority of the Court.
In his dissenting opinion in the Barnette case, Justice Frankfurter
declares: ". . . law is concerned with external behavior and not
with the inner life of man." Contrast that with the opinion of
Justice Murphy, who, siding with the majority, affirms that the
highest judicial duty is "to uphold spiritual freedom to its farthest
reaches." Or contrast Justice Frankfurter's attempt to exclude
from judicial consideration the effect of the West Virginia statute
on "the inner life of man," with the rationale of the majority opin-
ion, delivered by Justice Jackson. ".... the compulsory flag salute
and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind." Such action, the court held, invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit, which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to preserve from all official control.
By way of answer to that argument, Justice Frankfurter warns
his brethren: ". . . if the considerations governing constitutional
construction are to be substantially those that underlie legislation
then, indeed, judges should not have life tenure." And again, in
his dissent, Justice Frankfurter warns against the very dire danger
not only to the life-time jobs of his brethren on the bench, but to
the entire nation, if, as he says, "we unwarrantably enter social
and political domains wholly outside our concern", almost the
very words of Justice Sutherland's opinion disposing of Mr. Frank-
furter's brief in the Adkins case.
Again I skip the ethical question: Which of these decisions is
right and which of these decisions is wrong? What is of concern
for the moment, is a very much simpler question: What was it
that our judges thought they were doing in the Oleff case, the
Northwestern Shoshone case, the Adkins case, and some of the
flag salute opinions when they said that questions of righteousness,
or morality, or theology, or social policy or "the inner life of man"
could not be considered by a court of law?
I rather think that these cases throw a good deal of light on
the prevailing attitude of courts to questions of ethics. Perhaps
the most obvious fact, when we consider these and other cases, is
that, generally speaking, judges think they are doing the right
thing when they come to the decisions that they do come to. At
least I have never known a judge who admitted, or even thought
that he was doing what was wrong. I am quite willing to leave to
the psychologists the question whether judges make the decisions
they do make because they think they are right, or whether they
think the decisions are right because they have made them. If you
believe the former you are labeled an idealist; if you believe the
latter you are labeled a cynic. Not caring for either label, I leave
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that issue to Dean Brown and Professor Hartman. But whichever
way you answer that question, one thing remains pretty clear,
and that is that judges decide cases pretty much along the lines of
their own conceptions of what is, for them, right, decent, just, and
proper. And judges' ideas of what is right and decent about their
own behavior are inevitably tied up with their ideas of what is
right and decent about the behavior of other people. This means
that if you understand the ethical patterns, the value patterns, of
a judge, you are better able to predict what he is going to do, when
your client asks you for advice. You are likewise better able to
improve or enlighten the ethical systems of judges if you know
what they are. And that brings me to my final question: How
are we going to discover the ethical views of Justice White or
Justice Black? Or, more importantly, how are we going to dis-
cover the ethical views of the Roosevelt contingent in the Federal
judiciary or of the Truman contingent?
One thing that makes it especially hard to answer this question
is the judicial decorum that requires judges to conceal their ethical
assumptions behind their large black flowing robes. In fact a major
part of the judicial ritual consists of forms of magic whereby ethical
opinions are exorcized from the judicial chambers.
One of the simplest forms of magic is word magic. When the
Greeks were much bothered by the bad winds and storms on the
Black Sea, they gave the sea the name "Euxine", the "Sea of Good
Winds". And when the Viking explorers, some centuries later
were troubled at finding 7,000 foot layers of ice on one of their
newly discovered colonies, being the world's most successful real
estate operators, they called their new colony "Greenland", thus
establishing a pattern which suburban real estate developments
follow to the present day. In the same way, when we are worried
about the dangers of political corruption, recognizing, with Lord
Acton, that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely,
if we are particularly worried about the harm that an official may
do we call him "Honorable", or if he is very, very powerful, and
therefore very, very corruptible, we call him "Justice". I don't
know how much effect the name "Euxine" had on the wind velocity
of the Black Sea, or how much effect the name Greenland had on
the melting point of ice in that area, or how much effect the title
"Justice" had when applied to Mr. Sutherland or Mr. Tom Clark.
But at least these honorific words tell us something about the
people who use them and about their hopes and aspirations. And
all this paraphernalia, - the oath of office, and the robes, the
titles, the elevation of the place where judges sit above the place
where they stood when they were lawyers- all these elements
of ritual express certain widespread human hopes that men in
19511
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certain sects will utter words of justice as uniform as their robes,
ai of a higher quality than the words spoken a few inches lower
by mere lawyers.
According to the prevailing idea, views of ethics are highly
uncertain, shifting and variable, while rules of justice and law are
certain, stable, and unchanging. When we realize this, we can
begin to understand why the Ohio Supreme Court in the Oleff
case, when it considered the degree of sacredness of the rights
of joint depositors, felt compelled to exorcise theology, and why
Justice Jackson in the Shoshone case, and Justice Sutherland in
the Adkins case, and Justice Frankfurter in the Barnette case all
sought to exorcise morality from decisions in which they might
find moral scrutiny embarrassing.
Actually, judges are inclined to regard as theological only
those theologies that they do not share themselves. The Ohio
Supreme Court regarded its own opinions as to the sacredness of
certain property rights as not theological but as obvious truths;
the contrary views of unsuccessful counsel as to the sacredness of
rights of life are dismissed as theological. So, too, courts are gen-
erally inclined to regard as moral theories only those moral theo-
ries that they do not accept themselves without question. Justice
Sutherland was inclined to regard defenses of minimum wage
legislation for women as moral theory, whereas the denial of valid-
ity to such legislation he regarded as biological truth, or logic,
or eternal justice, or constitutional law. Such terms, then, as theo-
logical and moral become very good negative indicators of judicial
views on theology and ethics. It is a pretty safe rule that whenever
a judge says, "This is a court of law," and then goes on to say that
he cannot be guided by moral or theological considerations, he is
actually being guided by moral or theological considerations with-
out knowing it. Perhaps in saying this I am only repeating, in a
clumsy way, what Justice Holmes said many years ago:
I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately
to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social
advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the
often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such con-
siderations is simply to leave the very ground and founda-
tion of judgments inarticulate and often unconscious.11
Of course, in all this, judges are merely behaving like human
beings. We are all victims of the egocentric predicament. We can
all see other people's eyes, but our own eyes we never do see.
We all see other people's prejudices and moral assumptions; our
own prejudices and moral assumptions appear to us in the guise
of life's experience and wisdom. In fact, Descartes once said that
11 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 456, 467 (1897).
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of all God's gifts the most fairly distributed was good sense, seeing
that everyone was satisfied that he had received his fair share.
In days when orthodoxy was a term of praise, somebody coined
the remark "Orthodoxy is my doxy, heterodoxy is the other fel-
low's doxy". I think we may all say that religion is what I, and
those who believe like me, think about the unseen world, and
superstition is what the other fellow believes. Idolatry is the
other fellow's attitude toward the material things that enter into
religious experience; our own attitudes towards such material
objects we characterize more circumspectly as reverence for re-
ligious symbolism. Theories we agree with we call facts; facts we
disagree with we call theories. Other people's conceptions of the
universe we call metaphysics. Our own conceptions we call good,
hard, common sense. Generally speaking, common sense is the
metaphysics of 500 years ago slightly decayed.
Bertrand Russell has drawn attention to the relativity of our
every-day speech in what may be called the conjugation of ir-
regular adjectives of which he offers this example:
First person: "I am firm."
Second person: "You are obstinate."
Third person: "He is a pigheaded fool."
Or consider another example, offered by one of Russell's
followers:
First person: "I am righteously indignant."
Second person: "You are annoyed."
Third person: "He is making a fuss about nothing."
Or consider this example offered by a lady logician:
First person: "I have about me something of the subtle,
haunting, mysterious fragrance of the Orient."
Second person: "You rather overdo it, dear."
Third person: "She stinks.'u2
Once we recognize the personal distortions that affect each of
us, whether we are judges or non-judges, once we recognize the
blind spots that we each have in things that come close to us emo-
tionally, we have taken the first steps toward mutual understand-
ing on questions of right and wrong. Perhaps an analogy from
physics may be illuminating. Modern physics, thanks to Einstein,
has developed a theoretical basis for predicting that what is a
straight line to observation post A will be an ellipse to observation
post B, or that events which are seconds apart at observation post
C will be simultaneous at observation post D. In this way, by sys-
tematizing the relativity of the observation post, Einstein has made
it possible to correlate and coordinate all observations in physics.
It has eliminated relativity as a distorting factor. I think we seri-
12 Quoted in HAYAx&wA, LANGuAGE IN THouGHT AND AcToN, p. 96 (1949).
And see Tkomws, How To Tm STRAIGHT, p. 4 (1948).
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ously need such a theory, a field theory we might call it,13 in ethics
and especially in those fields of ethics that have a particular bear-
ing on our legal problems. Given such a theory we might be able
to eliminate moral relativity as a distorting factor and thus achieve
the same kind of mutual understanding translation between systems
in the field of ethics that we have achieved in physics.
Given such an approach, we might be able to understand some
things that are otherwise very puzzling. For example, how is it
possible for two lawyers, in their briefs on appeal in the same
case, to give such completely different accounts of the facts in the
case as you generally find in a pair of appellant's and appellee's
briefs? Or how is it possible for two opinions in the same Supreme
Court case to give such completely different accounts of the facts
and the issues? Or how is it possible for two lawyers or two judges
of equal intelligence to disagree so completely as to whether one
case is a precedent for another case?
The hypothesis that I want to submit for dissection by the
other participants in this discussion is that public policy is not an
emergency factor that you bring in as a lawyer when the cases
are against you, or that you invoke as a judge when you have
been sufficiently confused by advice of counsel. Public policy, or
social ethics or whatever else you want to call your analysis of
values is not an emergency third-string substitute that you send
out on the field when the regular players and the second string
"subs" are all used up. Rather, public policy is the field itself.
It is what gives pattern and significance to every play in the game,
to every citation of precedent, to every statement of facts, to every
assertion of causal efficacy. What facts in a case are important
depends upon the value screens through which you look at the
facts of a case. Whether the differences between two cases are
important or unimportant does not depend on logic. The differ-
ences are important or unimportant because of a theory of im-
portance. A theory of importance, I submit, is a theory of value.
Whenever we deal with such questions as whether the defendant
exercised due care, or whether the plaintiff received just compen-
sation, or when we consider what is fair comment in a libel case,
or unfair competition, or fair value, these key words, "due," "just,"
"fair," "reasonable," do not have self-sufficient meanings in them-
selves. These legal ideals have meaning only in the context of
whole patterns of social values, what we might call, in old-fashioned
language, ethical systems.
For most judges, for most lawyers, for most human beings,
we are as unconscious of our value patterns as we are of the oxy-
gen that we breathe. To bring these unconscious, uncriticized val-
13 Cf. F. S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YAlE L. J. 238 (1950).
[Vol. 12
JUDICIAL ETHICS
ue patterns into the light of day is, I think, the most important
task that faces our generation today in the field of law, a task
that requires cooperation among many schools and many disciplines.
I do not mean to suggest that increased attention to the implicit
hidden value judgments in our legal decisions and our statutes is
going to bring us swift remedies for all of the ancient legal diseases.
But it is encouraging to find an increased sensitivity to moral issues
in every-day cases. There are many signs today, in the law schools
and on the bench, of that increased sensitivity. The holding of
this symposium is only one of many signs of an increased sensitivity
to these problems on the part of practicing lawyers. This in-
creased sensitivity may help us to break down an attitude that
is just as potent a source of evil today as it was 3500 years ago,
the attitude that morality and ethics have to do with something
up in the heavens, or in some far-off land, and not with the here-
and-now of daily life. There are not as many teachers today in
the law schools as there used to be who insist that students forget
about the ethical issues in a case, forget about social policy con-
siderations, and stick to "the law", as if there ever were any law
that did not involve issues of ethics, as if there ever were a
court judgment that did not reflect somebody's views of social
policy, as if there ever were a case that did not depend for its
meaning and its precedent-value upon value-judgments of judges
and of the people that make judges and unmake judges. Those
who have faith in democracy and human reason know that con-
sciousness of these questions is the first step towards intelligent
mastery of our course and our destiny as a free people. We have
been told that without such vision the people perish. And we
know that without such vision, constitutional safeguards and prom-
ises of freedom are only words on old pages crumbling to dust.
All of us who face the obligations that our democracy attaches
to the study and the practice of law have a responsibility towards
our fellow citizens, that is a greater responsibility than those in
other fields and professions. Ours is the responsibility for deepen-
ing public consciousness of the hopes, the ideals, and the values
that are written into our constitutions and our laws. We have a
responsibility for broadening the consciousness of the ways in
which we fail to meet those hopes and those ideals. Our society,
by and large, has marked out its aspirations in the books of the
law, for those who can read them; and we who are charged with
the reading of those books have a special responsibility for keep-
ing alive the vision of our country's highest hopes and deepest
aspirations.
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